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In the late 1980s, the United States fre-
quently intervened in the foreign-
exchange market with the objectives of
encouraging a dollar depreciation in
1985 and stabilizing its value from early
1987 through early 1990. Unconvinced
of the effectiveness of such operations
and worried about possible conflicts with
monetary policy, the United States cur-
tailed its interventions during the early
part of the last decade and has intervened
on just one occasion since August 1995. 
As time has passed, the reasons for shun-
ning intervention seem to have been for-
gotten, and we hear again calls for action.
Last year, Japan, which has intervened in
foreign-exchange markets in an attempt
to halt or reverse the yen’s appreciation
against the dollar, suggested that the
United States and other advanced coun-
tries act in concert. With the euro now
edging below parity with the dollar, oth-
ers have suggested that the European
Central Bank intervene. In addition,
some economists continue to advocate
target zones for dollar exchange rates,
which implies a commitment to
exchange-rate management.
Most economists now regard foreign-
exchange-market intervention as gener-
ally ineffectual. As this Economic Com-
mentary explains, intervention cannot
systematically affect a nation’s exchange
rates when undertaken independent of its
monetary policy, and when undertaken
as a goal of monetary policy, exchange-
rate management can compromise price
stability and create confusion about
long-term policy objectives. These
observations, of course, do not mean that
intervention never has an effect on
exchange rates, but they do show that
the anticipated result is not a certainty. 
    Intervention and 
Monetary Policy
Although the Federal Reserve System
(FRS) and the Treasury’s Exchange Sta-
bilization Fund (ESF) share responsibil-
ity for intervention in the United States,
the ESF usually takes the initiative. The
ESF maintains a portfolio of foreign-
exchange reserves that it can sell to pro-
mote a dollar appreciation, and it holds a
limited amount of dollar assets that it
can sell to promote a dollar depreciation.
Separately, the FRS keeps its own port-
folio of foreign exchange for a dollar
defense and can create an unlimited
amount of dollars to foster a dollar
depreciation. Typically—but not
always—the ESF and the FRS intervene
in concert, contributing equally. The
Foreign Exchange Desk of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York executes all
transactions for both accounts.
If, for example, the United States wished
to stem an appreciation of the yen
against the dollar, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York would sell yen to
commercial banks and receive payment
in dollars, which is achieved by debiting
the banks’reserve accounts at the Fed-
eral Reserve. While one might expect
this transaction to increase the amount of
yen and to decrease the amount of dol-
lars in financial markets, it will not,
because central banks that conduct their
monetary policies under an interest-rate
target, like the Federal Reserve, the
European Central Bank, or the Bank of
Japan, automatically neutralize—or
sterilize—the impact of intervention on
their interest-rate targets. If, for example,
the open-market desk believes that the
injection of $600 million in reserves on a
specific day is consistent with maintain-
ing the current federal funds rate target,
and if the foreign-exchange desk has
separately withdrawn $200 million in
reserves through the sale of Japanese
yen, the open-market desk will increase
its injection to $800 million. Unless one
or both of the central banks that are party
to an intervention adjust their interest-
rate target in a manner consistent with
the objectives of intervention, they auto-
matically sterilize any foreign-exchange-
market interventions.
Ironically, however, if a central bank is
willing to alter its interest-rate target and
monetary base in pursuit of an exchange-
rate objective, transacting in foreign
exchange becomes completely unneces-
sary to achieve that end. If, for example,
the Federal Reserve sought a dollar
depreciation against the yen, it could eas-
ily lower the federal funds rate target and
inject reserves into the banking system
through standard open-market purchases
of Treasury securities. One might think
that expanding the monetary base
through yen purchases would have a
faster and bigger impact on the yen–
dollar exchange rate than expanding the
monetary base through standard open-
market operations, but recent empirical
research does not support this hypoth-
esis.1  Nonsterilized intervention seems
completely redundant to open-market
operations in domestic securities.
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operations or through interventions,
adjusting the monetary base in pursuit of
an exchange-rate objective can jeopar-
dize the attainment of a central bank’s
price-level objective. If, for example, a
depreciation of the dollar against the yen
stemmed from a decline in world
demand for U.S. goods, a contraction of
the U.S. money supply to bolster the dol-
lar could translate this export-demand
shift into a more broad-based deflation-
ary pressure. In this case, then, what the
United States gains in exchange-rate sta-
bility, it loses in price stability. 
Such conflict between policy objectives
is not always a problem for monetary
authorities. The above example assumed
that the depreciation of the dollar against
the yen resulted from a “real,” as
opposed to a monetary, event: Foreign-
ers reduced their purchases of U.S.
goods and services. If the underlying
cause of the dollar’s depreciation were,
instead, an excessively expansionary
U.S. monetary policy, then no incompat-
ibility would follow. This seemed to
have been the situation in the United
States last year. With the dollar depreci-
ating and domestic inflationary pressures
rising, a federal funds rate hike seemed
consistent with attaining both a stable
exchange rate and price level. 
Even if the Federal Reserve did not
operate under a federal funds rate target,
the System would have a second,
equally important reason for routinely
sterilizing the monetary effects of U.S.
intervention—its independence. As
noted earlier, the ESF of the U.S. Trea-
sury has primary responsibility for inter-
vention in the United States. Under these
circumstances, if the Federal Reserve
permitted ESF interventions to affect the
monetary base, it would provide the
Treasury with a means, albeit limited, of
compromising the independence of the
Federal Reserve’s monetary policies.
The autonomy of monetary policy seems
crucial to central banks’credibility. 
    Intervention as Information 
Although sterilized intervention affects
neither the monetary base nor other fun-
damental determinants of exchange
rates, empirical research does not dis-
miss intervention as totally ineffective. It
portrays, instead, a rather haphazard
relationship between intervention and
exchange rates, which varies across time
periods for any single exchange rate and
across exchange rates within many indi-
vidual time periods. Intervention’s effec-
tiveness seems to depend on some
unspecified aspect of the market, which
many economists believe to be the state
of private expectations.2 If intervention
actually does operate on market expecta-
tions, rather than on market fundamen-
tals, then it provides policymakers with
only a rather tenuous influence over
exchange rates, since success requires
authorities to possess better information
than the market and to convey this infor-
mation through official transactions.
Foreign-exchange markets are highly
efficient processors of information, but
they cannot be perfectly so. Exchange
rates will instead reflect information up
to the point where the benefits from
acquiring and trading on new informa-
tion just equal the added costs of doing
so. In a less than perfectly efficient mar-
ket, access to information differentiates
traders, and exchange-rate changes serve
as news conduits between more and less
informed market participants. Under
such circumstances, central banks could
affect exchange rates through interven-
tion if their actions revealed private
information to the market, or if they pos-
sessed a clearer understanding of current
market fundamentals than less informed
private traders. This seems a tall order. 
Nevertheless, some economists have
suggested that central banks might sig-
nal future changes in monetary policy
through their interventions, with sales or
purchases of foreign exchange implying,
respectively, prospective federal funds
rate increases or decreases.3 Such sig-
nals could be particularly credible
because the intervention would give the
monetary authorities an exposure in a
foreign currency that would result in a
loss, if they failed to validate their sig-
nals. Of course, if central banks eventu-
ally accommodated their signals, inter-
vention would not exist as a process
distinct from monetary policy—it would
no longer be sterilized. The issues raised
in the previous section about the nature
of the underlying disturbance to the
exchange market and about the redun-
dancy of intervention to standard open-
market operations again become rele-
vant. Moreover, policy signaling would
only influence exchange rates if the mar-
ket did not already anticipate a change.
Evidence from the federal funds futures
market suggests that participants predict
policy moves fairly accurately within a
two-month horizon.4 More direct tests
of the monetary signaling hypothesis,
while mixed, do not strongly support it.5
The information that a central bank con-
veys need not only be about future mone-
tary policies; monetary authorities could
conceivably have a better understanding
than the private sector about any and all
market developments and, therefore, a
more informed judgment about the con-
sistency of exchange rates. This may
sound reasonable, but is it likely?
    Do Central Banks Routinely
Possess Better Information
than the Market? 
If U.S. monetary authorities possess bet-
ter information than the market and if
they can convey this information to the
market through intervention, then pre-
dictable changes in dollar exchange rates
should accompany U.S. interventions.
Table 1 presents a statistical test of this
proposition. It essentially asks if the
exchange-rate changes around interven-
tion events are consistent with the
intended effects of the policy more often
than chance. 
Since we do not know the precise policy
intentions of specific intervention epi-
sodes, we offer four reasonable, albeit
somewhat arbitrary possibilities, and we
compare all interventions since 1985
against each of these. The possible policy
intentions appear as questions in table 1.
(The examples below elaborate on their
meaning.) The second column of the
table shows the total number of U.S. in-
terventions that occurred over the sample
period, which runs from January 4, 1985,
to March 3, 1997. Over the 3,072 busi-
ness days in the sample, the United States
sold German marks on 76 days and
bought German marks 138 days. Simi-
larly, the United States sold Japanese yen
on 82 days and bought yen on 108 days.
The next column, labeled “intervention
successes,” shows the percentage of
foreign-exchange purchases or sales that
were consistent with each of the specific
success criteria. Out of a total of 76 offi-
cial U.S. sales of German marks, for
example, 46 percent were associated
with a same-day appreciation of the dol-
lar. We consider these successful accord-
ing to our first success criterion. Out of
these same 76 interventions, however,
only 32 percent were associated with a
same-day appreciation of the dollar
when the dollar had depreciated over the
previous day. These 32 percent were
successful according to criterion two.
Similarly, 35 percent of the 82 official
U.S. sales of yen were associated with asame-day dollar depreciation that was
smaller than the previous day’s dollar
depreciation; they were successful
according to criterion three. Of these
same interventions, 1 percent were asso-
ciated with a same-day appreciation of
the dollar that was larger than the appre-
ciation on the previous day. They accord
with success criterion four. 
The normal day-to-day movements in
dollar exchange rates virtually guarantee
that some of the interventions will
appear successful under any criterion
purely by chance. To separate effective
policy from good fortune, we provide a
count of how frequently various success
criteria naturally occur in the sample
data, whether or not intervention takes
place. We call these “virtual successes”
and report their frequency in column
three of table 1. The dollar, for example,
appreciated against the German mark on
48 percent of 3,072 days in the sample
period. These days would please any
official who thought the dollar should
appreciate against its German counter-
part, hence their “virtual-success” name.
The table presents similar “virtual-
success” percentages for each type of
transaction and for each currency under
each success criterion. 
Only in one-half of the 16 cases pre-
sented in table 1 does the percentage of
actual successes in the sample exceed the
percentage of virtual successes. These
are concentrated under criteria two and
three in table 1. Many of these same dif-
ferences, however, seem rather small,
and we cannot place much confidence in
them. They could easily represent a pecu-
liarity of the sample period and not a
general property of intervention. After
applying statistical tests, however, we
can conclude with a high level of confi-
dence—95 percent—that the actual inter-
vention successes exceed virtual suc-
cesses in only 3 of these 16 cases.6
These appear in table 1 with an asterisk. 
The tests suggest that U.S. intervention
has value to foreign-exchange traders
only as a signal that the dollar’s recent
movements will moderate. When, for
example, the dollar is depreciating
against the yen, and the United States
sells yen, chances are good that the dol-
lar will immediately depreciate by a
smaller amount than traders observed on
the day before the intervention. The dol-
lar, however, is unlikely to appreciate
following the official sale of yen. Simi-
lar conclusions apply to official U.S. pur-
chases of yen and marks, but not to offi-
cial sales of marks. Amore detailed
analysis of these data suggests that these
successes were concentrated in late 1985
following the Plaza agreement and in late
1987 following the U.S. stock-market
crash. Uncertainty about monetary pol-
icy and economic conditions seemed to
characterize both of these periods.7 In-
tervention may have clarified private
traders’beliefs about monetary policy or
simply about the steady-state path of the
dollar during these times. 
    Conclusion 
Central banks cannot regularly influence
day-to-day exchange-rate movements
through sterilized intervention because
they do not customarily possess an infor-
mation advantage over private-sector
Possible Policy Intention #1: Dollar appreciation or depreciation. 
Does a dollar appreciation follow a U.S. sale of marks or yen?
Does a dollar depreciation follow a U.S. purchase of marks or yen?
Intervention Virtual
Interventions successes successes
Against MARKS    
Sales 76 46%  48%
Purchases 138 37% 51%
Against YEN
Sales 82 41% 50%
Purchases 108 46% 48%
Possible Policy Intention #2: Reversal in the current trend in the dollar.
Does a depreciating dollar appreciate following a U.S. sale 
of marks or yen?
Does an appreciating dollar depreciate following a U.S. purchase




Sales  763  32%  24%
Purchases  138   26%  25%
Against YEN
Sales  822  29%  25%
Purchases  108   28%  24%
Possible Policy Intention #3: Moderation of the current trend in the dollar. 
Does a depreciating dollar depreciate by less following 
a U.S. sale of marks or yen? 
Does an appreciating dollar appreciate by less following 




Sales 76 20% 15%*
Purchases 138 20% 14%*
Against YEN
Sales 82 35% 15%*
Purchases 108 21% 16%*
Possible Policy Intention #4: Intensification of the current trend in the dollar. 
Does an appreciating dollar appreciate by more following 
a U.S. sale of marks or yen? 
Does a depreciating dollar depreciate by more following 




Sales 76 4% 8%
Purchases 138 4% 9%
Against YEN
Sales 82 1% 8%
Purchases 108 4% 8%
Observations = 3,072
a. In all cases, the success criterion measures the change in the exchange rate over the current business day and
compares it, when appropriate, with changes over the previous business day. Criterion three does not include crite-
rion two. Asterisks indicate that the number of successful interventions is greater than the expected or mean value
at a 95 percent confidence level. Tests assume that successful interventions follow a hypergeometric distribution.
SOURCE:Authors.
TABLE 1  SUCCESS OFU.S. INTERVENTION, 
JANUARY4, 1985, TO MARCH 3, 1997atraders. From time to time, most likely
when markets are uncertain about the
future direction of monetary policy, ster-
ilized interventions may prove success-
ful. These instances, however, are the
exception, not the rule. Even in these
fortuitous cases, intervention will proba-
bly produce only a moderation in the
exchange rate’s trend, not a reversal in
its direction. Achange in one country’s
monetary policy relative to another’s
could probably achieve an exchange-rate
objective, but often at the loss of domes-
tic price stability. In any case, such a
policy requires no intervention at all. 
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